

## EXTENDING ROGERS'S THOUGHTS ON HUMAN DESTRUCTIVENESS

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**ABSTRACT.** *Carl Rogers explicitly described children's urges to inflict pain, a male organism directing a sexual assault on young girls, and a mother's organic need to aggress against her child. In light of these recognitions of human destructiveness by Rogers, Quinn (1993) has recently challenged the commitment of person-centered psychologists to the wholly constructive actualizing tendency. Quinn (1993) has argued for destructiveness being equally "at core" with constructive organismic capacities. He has also asserted that this possibility was acknowledged, although inadvertently so, by Rogers himself through various descriptions (admissions to?) human destructiveness. If person-centered psychology is equivocal about the inherentness of human destructiveness, then many person-centered deductions and applications become clouded. Quinn (1993) focused on client-centered therapy, arguing that the client's organismic valuing process, which may well include destructive features, has limited adaptive benefit. Although I do not find that Rogers recognized destructiveness as an inherent directionality, it is true that person-centered theory has not dealt with negative human behaviors in conceptually satisfying ways. This paper is a start toward changing that. Four explicit "cases" of human destructiveness are taken from prominent works and are explained by person-centered constructs and specific processes which Rogers saw as relevant to the actualization of destructiveness. The paper concludes with critical reflection on Quinn's (1993) developmental-interactional approach to psychotherapy, an alternative to the client-centered approach.*

A paper by Ralph Quinn (1993), "Confronting Carl Rogers: A Developmental-Interactional Approach to Person-Centered Therapy," appeared in the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*. Several aspects of this paper led me to think carefully about person-centered psychology and human destructiveness. I found the experience illuminating and am pleased to share it in this paper.

I believe person-centered psychologists agree that Rogers disavowed violence and destruction as a direction sought *inherently* by the human organism. Freud's death instinct, for example, is not a capacity which the organism strives naturally to actualize. This was my thinking when I read Quinn's (1993) position that person-centered psychology's "overly optimistic belief in the

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actualizing tendency and organismic valuing process has led to [unrealistic reliance] on empathy and unconditional positive regard in the psychotherapeutic encounter" (p. 6).

We are overly optimistic, according to Quinn (1993), because it is probable that destructive tendencies are as inherent to the human organism as are tendencies which maintain and enhance life. Quinn (1993) cited predictable sources (e.g., May's, 1969, daimonic concept) and then sought support for his proposition in an unusual way. He took instances of destructive behaviors and feelings *directly from Rogers's writings* and argued that even Carl Rogers seems to have acknowledged, although inadvertently so, the darker side of human nature. Here are the instances--I call them cases--cited by Quinn (1993, p. 12).

\_\_Case 1. A child "enjoys hitting baby brother. It feels good" (Rogers, 1959, p. 225).

\_\_Case 2. A youngster pulls his sister's hair and "finds it satisfying to hear her wails and protests" (Rogers, 1969, p. 243).

From these Quinn (1993) concluded that Rogers

inadvertently raises the issue of more destructive, violent urges within the individual. . . . Rogers openly acknowledges that *it feels satisfying* to pull baby sister's hair or to hit baby brother. . . and with this admission, he opens the door (but never goes through) to the possibility that nonbenevolent, non-growthful, destructive urges might well exist in each of us *in addition* to actualizing ones. (p. 12)

Well, Rogers hardly denied the existence of destructive urges and behaviors; these were often the focus of his latter (peace) workshops. I perceive, however, Quinn (1993) coming from a level different than Rogers' recognition of destructiveness. Quinn (1993) used cases 1 and 2 to forward the idea that human destructiveness is as inherent to the organism as is constructiveness. As Quinn (1993, p. 11) stated rhetorically, "What if *at core* [emphasis added] there are other [viz., destructive] urges as motivationally urgent and powerful as the actualizing tendency?" Given the possibility of such core motivation, Quinn (1993) warns that "we must learn to be more skeptical about our clients' inherent movement toward growth and full functionality. We ought at least to allow that urges toward (self-) destruction, stasis, dependency, alienation, addiction, violence are as possible as urges toward health and actualization" (p. 12).

#### *Two More "Destructive" Cases From Rogers*

I also know of descriptions of human destructiveness from Rogers. Let me add two cases to those reported by Quinn (1993) (see above).

\_\_Case 3. An adolescent boy suddenly jerks up the skirts of two young girls and examines their pelvic regions. The assault is attributed to the organism: "The organized character of the behavior [the skirt lifting and examination] grows out of the fact that the organism on a physiological basis can initiate and carry on complex behavior to meet its needs" (Rogers, 1951, p. 510).

\_\_Case 4. A mother acts in hostile and rejecting ways toward her child. Analysis of her behavior focuses on "the organic experience of dislike, distaste, or hatred toward her child. . . . The organic need is for aggressive acts which would fulfill these attitudes and satisfy the tension which exists" (Rogers, 1951, p. 511). (Case also discussed in Rogers, 1959.)

Indeed, if Quinn (1993, p. 12) sought to establish that Rogers "opens the door to the possibility that nonbenevolent, nongrowthful, destructive urges might well exist in each of us *in addition* to actualizing ones," then he missed the boat by not presenting cases 3 and 4. I think Rogers's attributions of maternal aggression and a sexual assault on children to organismic factors are, at face value, much more provocative and paradoxical for person-centered theory than the childhood behaviors described in cases 1 and 2.

Here we have four cases from prominent person-centered works that explicitly report human destructiveness. I can fantasize Quinn (1993) using them to rest his case for the "at-core-ness" of human violence and destruction and, hence, the need for psychotherapists "to be more skeptical about our clients' inherent movement toward growth and full functionality" (p. 12).

### *The Orientation of This Paper*

My intent here is not to resolve the ancient question of whether or not destructiveness and evil are inherent in human nature. My goal is the more modest one of providing explicit person-centered perspectives on human destructiveness. Because Quinn's (1993) article initiated my effort, let me relate a bit more about his overall thesis.

Quinn (1993) cited cases 1 and 2 as part of a logical foundation for his developmental-interactional approach to psychotherapy. I will discuss this approach later; suffice now to say that Quinn (1993) recognized less human potential for self-healing than do client-centered therapists. Quinn (1993) justified this position (and his therapeutic approach) partly on the contention that humans are, at core, as likely to have destructive tendencies as they do constructive ones. He explicitly used "destructive" cases 1 and 2 from Rogers to support this contention. This was an effective strategy. It raised doubt in the reader's mind about Rogers's own commitment to an inherent and wholly constructive directionality within clients.

I am a person-centered scholar, not a practitioner (e.g., see Ford, 1991; Ford & Maas, 1989). From my perspective, Quinn's (1993) paper is quite heuristic: Four cases of human destructiveness from Rogers (1951, 1959, 1969) invite careful thinking at fundamental conceptual levels lest person-centered theory become paradoxical. But is a theoretical treatise, which this paper essentially is, worthwhile? The teacher in me says yes:

*I am concerned about our students reading Quinn (1993), or the "destructive" cases themselves (in Rogers, 1951, 1959, 1969), and experiencing conundrums about person-centered psychology.*

This is not a frivolous concern. Quinn (1993, p. 12) himself found that Rogers's descriptions of human destructiveness "always seemed troubling to me." (Seeman, 1988, has expressed a similar concern.)

I will show that descriptions of destructiveness from Rogers need not be experienced as paradoxical or troubling. Rogers did not, as Quinn (1993) alluded, acknowledge, inadvertently or otherwise, an inherent, at-core human directionality toward destructiveness. The four cases presented above are understandable in ways that Rogers himself pointed to but did not conceptually amplify. I perceive this paper to be a reasonable extension of his thinking.

### *Rogers on Human Destructiveness*

Quinn's (1993) paper is, to my knowledge, the third round of examining person-centered perspectives on human destructiveness. The first was Walker's (1956) comparison of Rogers's views to the thesis from Rousseau that humans are God's perfect creations corrupted by imperfect societies. Rogers (1957) denied this linkage but did disavow an inherent destructiveness in humankind: "It will be clear that my experience provides no evidence for believing that if the deepest elements in man's nature were released we could have an uncontrolled and destructive id unleashed in the world" (p. 201).

The second round was an exchange with Rollo May. May (1982) argued his concept of the daimonic which postulates a fundamental good-evil duality in human nature (May, 1969). This was the essence of Rogers's (1982) response.

So, how do I account for the evil behavior that is so obviously present in our world? In my experience, every person has the capacity for evil behavior. I, and others, have had murderous and cruel impulses, desires to hurt, feelings of anger and rage, desires to impose our wills on others. It is well to bear in mind that I also have a capacity to vomit, for example. Whether I, or anyone, will translate these impulses into behavior depends, it seems to me, on two elements: social conditioning and voluntary choice. (p. 87)

It may seem that the second and third sentences confirm Quinn's (1993) assertion that Rogers "openly acknowledged" destructive capacities. In the next sentence, however, Rogers quickly likened these capacities to the organism's capacity to vomit. The important concept behind this analogy is explained more clearly in Rogers (1980).

Sometimes the growth [actualizing] tendency is spoken of as though it involved the development of all the potentialities of the organism. This is clearly not true. . . . The organism does not tend toward developing its capacity for nausea, nor does it actualize its potentiality for self-destruction, nor its ability to bear pain. Only under unusual or perverse circumstances do these potentialities become actualized. It is clear that the actualizing tendency is selective and directional--a constructive tendency, if you will. (p. 121)

The crucial concept is that even though the human organism may possess negative potentialities, these are developed and actualized only "under unusual or perverse circumstances." Negative potentialities are not constituents of the *inherent directionality* of the human organism. For instance, only under the unusual circumstance of eating spoiled food or perceiving one's body shape as badly skewed (a basis for maladaptive eating) does a person actualize the capacity to vomit.

"Unusual or perverse circumstances" is a broad stroke, but Rogers (1982) was more specific about processes which determine the actualization of destructiveness: "Whether I, or anyone, will translate these [destructive] impulses into behavior depends, it seems to me, on two elements: social conditioning and voluntary choice" (p. 87). Therefore, perverse circumstance, learning in social contexts, and volition should convincingly explain Rogers's (1951, 1959, 1969) "destructive" cases *sans* having to appeal to an inherent, what Quinn (1993) described as "at core," motivation or propensity for destructiveness.

#### *Person-Centered Perspectives on the Four "Destructive" Cases From Rogers*

Case 1 is the child who, in Rogers's words, "enjoys hitting baby brother. It feels good." Rogers gave scant context here so let me supplement with the common situation of a child having a younger sibling--the family baby. Baby brother usurps parental attention which is crucial to satisfying the older child's primordial and constructive need for positive regard (Rogers, 1959, p. 223). (Harris, Wolf, & Baer, 1969, described the role of parental attention in the area of positive regard.) Hitting baby brother reliably secures parental attention and thus satisfies the child's regard need. In simple social conditioning terms, hitting baby brother is rewarded by parental attention.

Conditioning also explains the child's destructive urge, the enjoyment of hitting--"it feels good." Hitting baby brother brings parental attention and thus reduces the child's frustration caused by withdrawal of attention. The baby's signs of distress upon being hit (like crying) are contiguous with the reduction of frustration in the older child, and hence these distress signs become secondary--*learned*--reinforcers of this child's hitting behavior. This means that even when there is little chance that hitting will evoke parental attention (e.g., children out of earshot

of the parents), the child is still motivated to hit in order to produce the secondary reinforcer (distress signs). Albert Bandura (1973) succinctly described this social learning process.

Aggressive behavior that removes frustrations is often accompanied by signs of pain and discomfort in those toward whom the attack is directed. Pain cues thus become rewarding through their repeated association with tension relief and removal of frustrations. As a result, people often behave aggressively for no other apparent reason than to produce signs of pain and distress in others. (p. 194)

Case 2 is the youngster who pulls sister's hair and "finds it satisfying to hear her wails and protests" (Rogers, 1969, p. 243). The social conditioning model described above (or a close variant) is equally applicable here. The satisfaction of hearing sister's wails and the enjoyment of hitting baby brother are not inherently pleasurable; they are *acquired* through a learning process.

The destructive behaviors and cruel impulses in cases 1 and 2 are parsimoniously explained by conditioning, a process especially applicable to young children who are quite susceptible to learning variables (see White, 1965). There is no need to posit an inherent or primary drive to injure others. In fact, in his analysis of a human drive for destruction Bandura (1973, p. 195) pointed to the absence of "any convincing evidence that people experience a mounting urge to hurt others, as would be expected from the characteristics usually assigned to drives."

Cases 3 and 4, a sexually related assault and a mother's aggression, are conceptually more intriguing than the cases discussed above. The behaviors and feelings in cases 3 and 4 are not those of playground mischief, and additionally, Rogers attributed the assault and aggression directly to the organism.

These cases entail two central facets of person-centered theory: (a) the *incongruence* of the self-concept with organismic experience (Rogers, 1951, pp. 509-510; 1959, pp. 203-204; 1963, pp. 15-16), and (b) the *resoluteness* of the organism toward actualizing its capacities and needs (Rogers, 1951, pp. 509-510; 1959, pp. 203-205; 1963, pp. 16-17).

The adolescent boy in case 3 assaults two little girls by raising their skirts and examining their pelvic regions. The youth's developmental circumstance was a fundamentalist milieu which created "a self-concept of purity and freedom from 'base' sexual impulses" (Rogers, 1951, p. 509). The organism's experience of sexual curiosity, concomitant with organic changes of puberty, was denied symbolization in the boy's awareness. Had this experience been accurately symbolized in the context of his moralistic self-concept, the youth's need for positive self-regard would not have been fulfilled.

"The developing sexuality of an adolescent boy, and the accompanying curiosity, constituted a strong organic need for which there seemed no channel of satisfaction which was consistent with the concept of self" (Rogers, 1951, p. 510). Therefore the organism, which one way or another always actualizes its needs and capacities (Rogers, 1951, pp. 507-509; 1959, p. 203; 1963, pp. 15-18) commandeered instrumental behavior and sated its curiosity about female anatomy by spontaneously examining the little girls. The case demonstrates that "the organism on a physiological basis can initiate and carry on complex behavior to meet its needs" (Rogers, 1951, p. 510).

No doubt the young victims of this assault were terror stricken, and their parents may have perceived the youth as despicably evil--"a bad seed." Notwithstanding these understandable reactions, the crucial conceptual question remains: *Was the youth inherently--"at core" as Quinn would say--motivated or driven to assault and inflict terror on his victims?* No. The inherent organismic capacity which sought actualization was the wholly constructive one of sexual curiosity. This capacity could not be stated in normative fashion (e.g., viewing pornographic

pictures) because perverse circumstances--the fundamentalist milieu--had removed the self-structure's regulation of organic sexuality due to the condition of worth that the boy had introjected from this circumstance.

Case 4 is the mother who acts in hostile, aggressive, and rejecting ways toward her child. There is "the organic experience of dislike, distaste, or hatred toward her child. . . . The organic need is for aggressive acts which would fulfill these attitudes and satisfy the tension which exists" (Rogers, 1951, p. 511).

As in case 3, we should find a condition of worth which vitiates the accurate psychological experience of an inherently *constructive* organismic capacity. This conditionality is tied to the woman's self-concept as a caregiver, which can be "summed up by saying, 'I am a good and loving mother'" (Rogers, 1951, p. 511), one willing to give up my entire being to the mothering enterprise. The constructive capacity is autonomy, the organism's capacity to develop "away from heteronomy, or control by external forces" (Rogers, 1959, p. 196). This capacity is blocked by the all-giving condition of worth; namely, the woman surrendered career and self-interests to be the consummate, at least in view she was taught, caregiver.

The loss of autonomy gives rise to frustration and anger toward the child who personifies this loss. These emotional experiences toward the child, however, cannot be accurately symbolized because they are incongruent with the all-giving concept of self: A totally loving and giving mother does not feel negatively about the very being of her child. Rogers (1959, p. 238) described this case thusly. "The mother feels 'You [the child] annoy me because you interfere with my career,' but she cannot be aware of this because this experience is incongruent with her concept of herself as being a good mother."

The organism will actualize its frustration/anger at the blockage of autonomy *and* will reinstate this crucial capacity. It does so by punishing the child; but this, of course, must be congruent with the mother's all-giving condition of worth. Parental punishment is generally accepted by society if children's behaviors truly warrant it. Therefore the mother, in rationalizing fashion, construes "much of [the child's] behavior as being bad, deserving punishment, and therefore the aggressive acts can be carried through, without being contrary to the values organized in her [all-giving mother] picture of self" (Rogers, 1951, p. 512).

Would a consistent regimen of punishment and hostility toward her child secure greater autonomy for this person? I suspect so. The child would likely distance herself from this incessant source of negativity, or the mother could appeal to family members, "Can Jeannie spend some time with you? Her misbehavior is driving me crazy; maybe you can shape her up." If the family consented, the mother would have more time for self-interests (e.g., return to the workplace).

As we asked in the three preceding cases, does the hostility and aggression in case 4 stem from an at-core drive or need for destructiveness? Again, no. The inherent, at-core factor is the organism's wholly constructive need for autonomy (Angyal, 1941; Rogers, 1959), the gratification of which was blocked by a condition of worth appended to the self-structure.

Cases 3 and 4 nicely combine the factors of social conditioning and perverse circumstances through which Rogers (1982) explained human destructiveness. The perverse circumstances are inept cultural agents who taught "sexual feelings are evil" (case 3) and "loving mothers do not have any negative feelings about caregiving" (case 4). The social conditioning of these perspectives through conditional positive regard means that the perspectives were introjected as conditions of self-worth, which in turn led to the denial (case 3) and distortion (case 4) of organismic experiences. It is important to recognize that these experiences are related to the constructive, *not destructive*, primordial capacities of sexual curiosity and autonomy.

### What About Choice?

"Whether I, or anyone, will translate [destructive] impulses into behavior depends, it seems to me, on two elements: social conditioning and voluntary choice" (Rogers, 1982, p. 87). How is the latter factor implicated in human destructiveness?

The choice to behave destructively appears evident in the following record from a peace workshop in Ireland. "A Protestant young woman said in one of the early sessions, 'If a wounded IRA man were lying before me on the street, I would *step* on him!' This was typical of the bitter feelings expressed" (Rogers, 1982, p. 87). A strong commitment to her ideology underlay the woman's self-proclaimed choice to aggress against an injured person. While this aggression appears to be volitional, I believe the role of choice in destructive behavior is intertwined with other person-centered factors discussed in this paper. Let me explain.

Did the youth in case 3 assault the girls by choice? No. In fact, he genuinely denied that the episode had even occurred until presented with indisputable evidence, to which he responded, "I was not myself" (Rogers, 1951, p. 510). Was the hostile and aggressive mother in case 4 free to choose how to construe her child's behavior? No. The all-giving condition of worth confounded the woman's phenomenology so that she consistently perceived misbehavior from her child. Freedom of choice, more precisely the *breadth of choice*, in each of these cases was restricted by histories of conditional positive regard and debilitating conditions of worth.

In the case of the aggressive Irish woman, who declared she would squash an injured person, it seems reasonable that conditional positive regard and conditional self-worth played significantly in her "choice" to aggress. Surely she experienced social regard, support, and comradeship when she espoused negativity toward the IRA. Her anti-IRA environment would create a salient condition of worth which would oppose the woman feeling anything *but* hatred for IRA people. Given her social conditioning and its introjection, I do not think this person could accurately symbolize the full spectrum of organismic experience within an IRA context; for instance, she obviously denied the experience of concern and compassion for a fellow human being lying injured in the street.

The Irish workshop was "a climate of understanding and acceptance" (Rogers, 1982, p. 88). My hunch is that the participants' conditions of worth relative to "hating Catholics, hating Protestants" were lifted. Rogers's description bears this out. The participants "changed so much in attitudes in the short sixteen hours of contact that when they went back to Belfast they worked in teams of two to show the [workshop] film to groups in the interest of reconciliation" (Rogers, 1982, p. 88).

My perspective on the aggressive Irish woman is that the person-centered process facilitated positive change in the breadth and quality of personal choice, and it was the choice toward peace which reflects movement of the organism in the syntropic direction of the actualizing tendency. This perspective on choice and destructiveness is congruent with Rogers's (1980) proposition that "with greater self-awareness, a more informed choice is possible, *a choice more free from introjects* [emphasis added], a *conscious* [his emphasis] choice that is even more in tune with the evolutionary flow" (p. 127).

### Evidence Outside of Person-Centered Theory

I have treated the four "destructive" Rogerian cases under review in terms of person-centered perspectives which point convincingly to the role of extraorganismic factors in the calculus of human destructiveness. Is there evidence from *other* quarters that human destructiveness is significantly mediated by external factors?

Gibson (1991) recently described how average individuals can be very effectively taught to behave in absolutely heinous ways (e.g., Nazi concentration camp guards and torturers for the Greek *junta*). Here are some prominent learning processes discussed by Gibson (1991); as you

read them you might recall Rogers's (1982) linkage of destructiveness to social conditioning: depersonalization of victims by training the use of nonhuman and/or demeaning personal constructs, the reinforcement of obedience and swift and severe punishment of disobedience to authority, the establishment of elite in-groups to diffuse individual responsibility, and systematic desensitization to hurting others by gradation of injurious behaviors.

Is there convincing evidence that perpetrators of destruction possess something like a greater capacity or propensity toward aggression? Gibson (1991) reported that Altemeyer (1988) isolated three dispositions relative to human destructiveness: authoritarian submission, conventionalism (in the Kohlbergian sense), and authoritarian aggression (righteous aggression to stem a dangerous world). Notably, all of these predisposing factors "are taught, according to Altemeyer, beginning in early childhood, at home, in church, in school, and on the streets" (Gibson, 1991, p. 78).

There is another revealing point in Gibson's (1991) paper. In several prominent treatments of extreme antisocial behavior (e.g., Arendt, 1964; Haritos-Fatouros, 1988) it is reported that "perpetrators of pain often suffer intense strain particularly when they have to commit their acts in close contact with their victims" (Gibson, 1991, p. 76). This observation is inconsistent with what would be expected if humans possessed a primordial--at core--urge to injure others; that is, should there not be some evidence that hurting people leads to the reduction and not the increase of tension? The intense stress of inflicting pain is, however, consistent with Rogers's (1959, 1980, 1982) position that the natural direction of the human organism is toward the maintenance and enhancement of life, not its destruction.

In the landmark volume, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, Erich Fromm reviewed anthropological evidence for the inherentness of cruelty and destructiveness in our species. He concluded:

The anthropological data have demonstrated that the instinctivistic interpretation of human destructiveness is not tenable. While we find in all cultures that men defend themselves against vital threats by fighting (or fleeing), destructiveness and cruelty are minimal in so many societies that these great differences could not be explained if we were dealing with an "innate" passion. Furthermore, the fact that the least-civilized societies. . . show less destructiveness than the more-developed ones speaks against the idea that destructiveness is part of human "nature." (Fromm, 1974, p. 177)

The seed that Quinn (1993, p. 11) sought to plant--"What if at core there are. . . [destructive] urges as motivationally urgent and powerful as the actualizing tendency?"-- is, in light of the evidence, moot.

#### *A Concern About Quinn's Developmental-Interactional Approach to Psychotherapy*

Quinn (1993) advocated an isomorphism between psychotherapy and life. Just as adults "confront, contradict, and nudge" (Quinn's terms) children along during development, so should the therapist confront, contradict, and nudge the client toward adaptive change. In other words, "psychotherapy is often. . . [an] absolutely necessary replication of what should have happened in the natural facilitation of development" (Quinn, 1993, p. 17). Hence, "just as in the natural progression of development, there is often a need (usually later in the therapy) for some contradiction, some nudging, some confrontation, that is, saying the hard truths that help a client move toward fuller functionality" Quinn (1993, p. 17).

There might be a basis for this approach to psychotherapy if the inherent directionality of the human organism was a stew of destructive and constructive tendencies. If the four "destructive" Rogerian cases could not be parsimoniously explained by extraorganismic factors; if Bandura

(1973) and Gibson (1991) had reported psychological evidence of primordial motivation toward cruelty and violence; or if Fromm (1974) had found anthropological basis for instinctivistic destructiveness, then clients might be constructively confronted and nudged away from inherently maladaptive persuasions. The reality, however, is that at-core destructiveness in human beings is not supported by the evidence.

Quinn (1993) sees a necessary linkage between psychotherapy and "the natural progression of development" outside the counseling room. I am concerned about what happens so regularly during such real life progression. As a university premedical advisor I often see students who were confronted and nudged by significant others toward premedical course work. Sadly, not a few of these folks were nudged inappropriately. When the crucial advising agenda--what do *you* want to pursue?--emerges, some premedical students begin to recognize that the stressful and unsuccessful year in chemistry and biology was not of their own choosing; and they slowly become aware of their history of conditional positive regard and subsequent conditions of self-worth.

Are not the liabilities of conditional positive regard and conditions of worth also inherent in Quinn's (1993) developmental-interactional approach to psychotherapy? Who is to say that Quinn's (1993) contradicting-confronting-nudging therapist, who essentially behaves as an authority on adaptive living, will not perpetuate a client's extant conditions of worth, or perhaps even facilitate the creation of new ones? For example, consider case 3 where the mother perceives excessive misbehavior and punishes her child for behaviors which would seem neutral to most observers. Particularly with the acute awareness of child abuse in today's society, I can imagine Quinn's (1993) developmental-interactional therapist, especially an inexperienced one, interacting with the mother thusly (Jeannie is the child): "All Jeannie did was leave her toy in the chair while she went to the bathroom; she came right back and started playing with it again. You really scolded her for not putting the toy away. Why did you feel Jeannie needed to be punished for that?"

Confrontation invites justification and rationalization, the very negative psychological processes *that perpetuate* the mother's problem in living (see previous discussion of case 4). Indeed, in the case of the hostile mother, Rogers described the woman's rationalizing distortions when others confronted her about rejecting her child (see 1951, pp. 515-516). It is likely that the mother's retort to the therapist's confrontation would be, "Oh that's just one instance of what Jeannie *always* does. She takes no responsibility for her toys, clothes, or helping around the house." Is this not just another opportunity for the client to rehearse and self-reinforce a maladaptive process?

I think that Quinn's (1993) developmental-interactional therapist has the intent of getting clients "to places" (my expression). If I contradict and confront you for being where you are, is not my intent to nudge you toward another place of *my choosing*? Does such intent on the part of the therapist regularly facilitate positive change and growth? Jerold Bozarth provides a clear person-centered answer.

The therapist's intent is not to promote feelings or to help the client to become more independent or to get the client anywhere. The goal is *not* self-actualization, actualization, independence or to help the client to become a "fully functioning" person. *The goal is only to be a certain way and by being that way to promote a natural process.* (Bozarth, 1992, p. 13)

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